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INVENTORIES  HAVE PLAYED  A CRUCIAL  ROLE in U.S. business  cycles,  for 
their perverse behavior has acted to magnify rather than dampen cyclical 
swings in  demand.  Indeed,  fluctuations in  inventory accumulation ac- 
counted on the average for 75 percent of the decline in real gross national 
product (GNP) experienced in the four recessions between 1948 and 1961. 
In addition, the erratic short-term behavior of inventory accumulation- 
typically representing half of  the variation in quarterly GNP  growth- 
creates a severe forecasting problem. 
The topic is of current  interest for two reasons. First, although a reduced 
rate of inventory accumulation contributed to the slowdown in the first 
half of 1970, the magnitude of the swing in inventory investment has been 
modest by comparison with those in similar postwar periods. Thus current 
developments stand in sharp contrast with experience as recent as 1966, 
when the annual rate of inventory accumulation reached $18.6 billion in 
the fourth quarter  with a major reversal down to $4.4 billion by the second 
quarter of 1967.1  Do the two periods differ because the current slackening 
in sales was  anticipated to  an extent that allowed production to  adjust 
smoothly? Or must  alternative explanations be  sought  for  the  current 
stability of inventory investment? 
Second, just as inventories have had a major influence during the con- 
tractionary phase  of past cycles, they have been an important source of 
1. For an analysis  of that experience,  see Barry  Bosworth,  "Current  Inventoty-Sales 
Relationships,"  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (1: 1970),  pp. 134-39. 
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expansion during the initial stages of recovery-accounting  for an average 
of 40 percent of the growth in real GNP in the first two quarters following 
the trough. Such historical experience has led some observers to expect a 
similar recovery in late 1970 or in 1971. Yet an analysis in terms of a typical 
"inventory cycle" is not applicable to the current situation simply because 
the  1969-70 economic  slowdown has not  been associated with a major 
inventory decumulation. 
Another element in the near-term outlook for inventory investment is 
the current decline in defense procurement, which will be accompanied 
by a decline in inventories of defense industries. The importance of defense 
in the overall inventory outlook is significant, but not so overwhelming as 
a casual look  at the period of defense buildup might suggest. The rapid 
expansion of defense orders and outlays in 1966 did coincide in time with 
the major overall inventory buildup during that period; and some of the 
inventory investment reflected a desire to fill the production pipeline in 
the defense industry with raw materials and goods-in-process. But analy- 
sis of that period indicates that only a minor fraction of the total inventory 
accumulation came in response to the defense buildup. 
Concepts  and  Data 
Inventory investment is dominated normally by the short-run adjust- 
ment of stocks to a relatively accurately known longer-term path. Varia- 
tions in the long-run stock have only infrequently  constituted a major fore- 
casting problem, since the ratio of the inventory stock to sales has been 
highly stable over periods of two to five years, after allowance for a modest 
secular downtrend. On the other hand, forecasting the short-run changes 
in stocks around this path poses serious problems, for they are highly vola- 
tile. In part this volatility is accounted for by a more rapid adjustment of 
actual to desired stocks for inventories than for homes, plant and equip- 
ment, or even consumer durables. But the forecasting problem is compli- 
cated further because unanticipated sales changes must result in equal 
changes in stocks in the opposite direction, to the extent that the surprises 
are not immediately matched by expanded or curtailed production. 
The interpretation of short-run inventory movements is further compli- 
cated by the fact that estimates of inventory accumulation that enter the 
national  accounts are subject to  more  severe statistical problems than 
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at a point in time rather than as an average of several periods, the measure- 
ment error is likely to be greater than that for corresponding estimates of 
flows. In addition, for the aggregate economy, inventories exhibit a "float" 
problem similar  to that of trade debt and the money supply in the monetary 
sector. Unknown quantities of goods are continuously in transit between 
business establishments, and there is little reason to expect this flow to be 
much more stable than the mail float component  of the money supply. 
But unlike money, inventory estimates have no control total and must be 
calculated as the sum of individual firm reports. Finally, the national ac- 
counts data measure changes in the volume of inventories by adjusting the 
book value data for price changes-through  the inventory valuation adjust- 
ment-and  this introduces another volatile source of potential error. 
While these conceptual and statistical problems make a high degree of 
accuracy more than usually difficult to obtain, nothing less will suffice if a 
meaningful evaluation of the economic impact of inventory investment is 
to be made. A 1 percent error in forecasting nonfarm inventories does not 
seem large if viewed as less than half of a single day's sales. Yet this would 
imply about a $6.8 billion error (annual rate) in the quarterly estimates of 
GNP in the national accounts. 
The following section presents a set of equations that provide a frame- 
work for examining recent inventory developments. The results emphasize 
the need for  at least some disaggregation of  inventory investment as a 
means  of  isolating  important differences in  inventory behavior among 
major economic sectors. They also provide a partial list of the major de- 
terminants of inventory accumulation that must be considered in predicting 
future developments. 
Next, these empirical relationships are used to examine the reasons for 
the relative stability of recent inventory investment compared with histori- 
cal experience, especially with the 1966-67 period. The paper concludes by 
exploring the importance of special factors, particularly  defense orders, for 
inventory investment in the near future. 
Statistical Findings 
Any detailed examination of inventory investment requires at the mini- 
mum a distinction among three sectors: nondurables (trade and manufac- 
turing combined), durable trade, and durable manufacturing. Although 
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are important differences in inventory behavior among these sectors that 
deserve recognition. It is necessary to distinguish between production in 
response to  known  orders-production  to  order-and  production  in 
anticipation of  future demand-production  to  stock.  In  the  latter case, 
inventory planning is complicated by errors in sales forecasts that lead to 
involuntary inventory changes. In the former case,  which characterizes 
inventories in durable manufacturing, sales surprises are less important. 
Rather,  inventory movements  are dominated  by  goods-in-process  and 
require an alternative explanation. 
Inventory investment of producers to stock can be viewed as an attempt 
to  smooth  out production by holding stock  as a buffer against sudden 
changes in sales. This type of behavior can be described formally by speci- 
fying  a desired inventory-sales relationship, a production rule, and the 
determinants of expected sales.2  Desired inventories at the end of a period 
V* may be taken to be a linear function of expected sales during the period 
St with an intercept (positive or negative) denoted as a and a slope-coeffi- 
cient (positive) denoted as b. Then: 
V* =  a +  bSt. 
Production Pt is planned to equal expected sales plus a proportion c of the 
difference between desired and actual stocks at the end of the previous 
period: 
Pt  =  Ste  +  c (Vt*  -  Vt-1)* 
Then actual inventory accumulation in the period (Vt -  V_1), which will 
be the difference  between production and actual sales during the period St, 
will display the familiar stock-adjustment form, 
(1)  Vt-  Vtl  =  ca +  cbSee-cVt-l  +  (Se-  St). 
Thus, in the buffer stock model, inventory accumulation is composed of an 
anticipated component, which is related to the speed with which production 
is adjusted to  sales changes, and an unanticipated component resulting 
2. For a more  detailed  presentation  of this theory,  see Lloyd A. Metzler,  "The  Nature 
and Stability  of Inventory  Cycles,"  Review  of Economic  Statistics,  Vol. 23 (August 1941), 
pp. 113-29; Michael  C. Lovell, "The Contribution  of Inventory  Investment  to Cyclical 
Reversals  in Economic Activity,"  in Inventory  Fluctuations  and Economic  Stabilization, 
Hearings  before  the Subcommittee  on Economic  Stabilization,  Automation,  tand  Energy 
Resources  of the Joint Economic  Committee,  87 Cong. 2 sess. (1962), pp. 245-73; and 
Charles  Holt and others, Planning  Production,  Inventories,  and Work  Force (Prentice- 
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from errors in the sales forecast. In the absence of appropriate sales fore- 
casts, current and lagged sales are introduced into the equation and allowed 
to serve as a proxy for expected sales. 
Table  1 presents the coefficients of  a  set  of  representative inventory 
equations for the major sectors, generally based on quarterly estimates of 
constant-dollar inventory stock from the Office of  Business Economics 
for the period 1953-69. 
DURABLE  TRADE 
The buffer stock model is most directly applicable to the durable trade 
sector. The  greater cyclical  sensitivity of  durable goods  sales,  together 
with a higher inventory-sales ratio, results in more pronounced cyclical 
inventory movements than appear for nondurables. 
The  changing timing  of  introduction  of  new  models  and  numerous 
automobile and steel strikes create difficulties in accounting for durable 
trade within a more aggregative framework. Some of these problems are 
reduced by eliminating the 1959 steel strike and the more severe auto strikes 
from the data sample. Nevertheless, the equation embraces several periods, 
such as the first quarter of 1961, when sudden movements in inventories of 
auto dealers cause substantial errors in predicting the total. The equation 
also noticeably understates inventory accumulation in durable trade in late 
1958 and throughout 1966. 
The statistical results show a potent negative impact of existing stocks 
on inventory investment. They also suggest that, either because forecasts 
of sales are quite accurate or because adjustments of stocks are rapid, a 
higher level of sales actually raises inventory investment within the current 
quarter. But a larger part of the resulting addition to stocks takes place in 
the next quarter. 
NONDURABLES 
Because sales of nondurables are relatively insensitive to cyclical influ- 
ences, and because these goods are characterized  by relatively  low inventory- 
sales ratios, inventory investment in this sector makes little contribution 
to major shifts in production. In fact, the variance of  inventory inivest- 
ment is only slightly larger than the expected sampling variability of the 
basic surveys of reporting firms. A large proportion of the existing variance 212  Barry Bosworth 
Table 1. Coefficients from Inventory Investment  Equations, by Sector, 
1953-69 
Equation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Equipment  Durable  Durable 
Independent  Durable  Non-  and  manufac-  manufac- 
variable  trade  durables  defense  turinge  turinga 
Lagged  stock  -0.330  -0.192  -0.061  -0.160  -0.171 
(7.2)  (4.5)  (1.8)  (6.7)  (6.3) 
Current  sales  0.110b  -0.142  -0.017  0.057  0.102 
(1.5)  (1.8)  (0.6)  (2.4)  (2.7) 
Lagged sales  0.262  0.265  .  -0.038  -0.026 
(2.8)  (3.3)  (1.5)  (0.8) 
Buying policyc  ...  0.053  0.138  ...  ... 
(4.6)  (5.8) 
Percent change  in  ...  -0.090  ...  ... 
farm pricesd  (4.0) 
Change in orders  ...  ...  0.426e  ...  1.51f 
(3.7)  (3.5) 
Capacity utilization  ...  ...  ...  ...  -1.  88g 
times change in orders  (3.1) 
Predicted inventory  ...  ...  ...  1.83  1.08 
change  of equipment  (7.1)  (3.4) 
and defense 
Time  ...  0.154  ...  0.087  0.044 
(3.5)  (3.4)  (1.8) 
Constant  5.84  7.67  -0.109  7.48  2.83 
(5.7)  (3.2)  (0.5)  (3.8)  (1.3) 
R2  0.56  0.58  0.82  0.84  0.88 
Standard  error  of estimate  0.96  0.98  0.63  0.96  0.85 
Source: Based on constant-dollar inventory data for  1953-69 from U.S.  Department of  Commerce, 
Office of Business Economics. 
Note:  The flow data are quarterly,  seasonally adjusted at annual rates. Those for equipment and defense 
are in billions of current  dollars. All others are in billions of 1958 dollars. Stocks are expressed  at four times 
actual level. The equations are based on ordinary least squares estimates; it was found that corrections for 
simultaneous equation bias and autocorrelation did not materially affect the coefficients. The numbers in 
parentheses are t ratios. The overall standard error is estimated at $1.7 billion. 
a.  Includes predicted value of inventory investment for the equipment and defense group. Thus sales, 
orders, and lagged inventory stock of that group are excluded from the respective  explanatory variables. 
b.  Sales measure is consumer expenditures on durable goods. 
c.  Proportion of firms reporting commitments of sixty days or longer to the National Association of Pur- 
chasing Management, scaled by sales. 
d.  One-quarter  proportionate change in price deflator for farm output, scaled by sales. 
e.  0.426 is the sum of lagged weights; the successive  weights, starting  from the current  quarter  and working 
back eight quarters,  are: 0.010, 0.028, 0.092, 0.074, 0.071, 0.070, 0.046, 0.027, 0.008. 
f.  1.51 is the sum of lagged weights; working backward from the current quarter, the successive weights 
are: 1.048, 0.454, 0.082,  -0.070. 
g.  -1.88  is the sum of lagged weights:  -1.290,  -0.563,  -0.106,  0.082. Analyzing Inventory Investment  213 
is  accounted for  by  erratic quarter-to-quarter movements, without  the 
cumulative cyclical fluctuations that are so apparent in durable goods. 
Although it is strictly applicable only to inventories of finished goods, 
the extension of the buffer stock model to all of the nondurable sector does 
not appear to cause any major difficulty.  In general, the production period 
is sufficiently short that no  distinction is required among inventories by 
stage of fabrication. Further disaggregation does not improve the overall 
predictions, perhaps because the  distinction between the  inventories of 
finished goods  of  an intermediate producer and of purchased materials 
of  a final producer introduces a degree of randomness to  the  stage-of- 
fabrication categories. 
It does, however, prove useful to go beyond the basic buffer stock model 
to  account for some special characteristics of inventory changes in non- 
durable goods. Agricultural products, which experience sudden and largely 
unpredictable changes in supply, are responsible for some of the erratic 
inventory movements in this sector. Unanticipated variations in short-run 
supply are necessarily absorbed by the inventory stock. This source of in- 
ventory change is taken into consideration by the addition of a variable in 
the equation for this sector: The quarterly  change in the price deflator for 
farm output is inserted as a measure of changing supply conditions. There 
is also some evidence that lengthening delivery delays within manufactur- 
ing induce firms to hold higher inventory stocks. To account for this, the 
equation includes a measure of long-term purchase commitments, desig- 
nated "buying policy," as a proxy for delivery delays.3 
With these variables included, the statistical results show the expected 
negative impact of existing stocks and the positive impact of lagged sales 
on inventory investment. Unlike durable trade, however, the nondurable 
sector displays a negative relationship between current sales and inventory 
investment, suggesting that sales surprises dominate, and temporarily push 
inventories in the opposite direction. 
DURABLE  MANUFACTURING 
Inventory investment within durable manufacturing differs sharply from 
that in the other sectors. While it shows a variance nearly three times that 
3. The buying policy variable  is the level of current  shipments  (a scale factor) times 
the percentage  of firms reporting  purchase  commitments  of sixty days or longer, from 
the National Association of Purchasing  Management,  as reported  monthly  in Business 
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of either of the other two sectors, and accounts for a major proportion of 
the cyclical changes in total inventories, it displays a far greater quarter- 
to-quarter continuity than durable trade and nondurables. In addition, the 
inventory-sales ratio is not  as stable here in the long run as it is in the 
other sectors. 
The major differentiating  factor is the magnified role of work-in-process 
inventories. For example, the higher inventory-sales ratio of durable rela- 
tive to  nondurable manufacturing is  almost fully accounted for  by the 
higher level of work-in-process relative to sales-about  0.8 against 0.2 for 
monthly data. It is also here that the post-1966 rise in the overall ratio of 
inventories to sales is concentrated. 
The  greater importance of  goods-in-process inventories results  from 
the relatively long  period of  production for most  firms within durable 
manufacturing. Thus, a substantial proportion of inventory investment is 
related to the lag between the initial production response to new orders 
and their final shipment. This is a more passive process than that implied 
by the buffer stock model in the sense that firms are responding to past 
orders rather than anticipating future sales. 
Firms tend to produce to order rather than to stock where long periods 
of production are associated with specialized products. The result is that 
finished goods  inventories are of relatively minor importance, and sales 
forecast errors are not a major source of instability. Purchased materials 
remain a significant element of variation, but stocks of materials will be 
more closely related to new orders than to shipments. 
The major significance of these distinct characteristics  of durable manu- 
facturing is to  shift the emphasis in the explanation of inventories from 
shipments to new orders. That new orders are important to the individual 
firm does not necessarily imply that they are equally so at the aggregate 
level. For example, in the extreme case where all final goods are produced 
to stock and intermediate goods are produced to order, orders would be 
an important determinant of inventories for intermediate  goods producers. 
But, if these orders merely reflect expected future sales of the finished goods 
producers, they would simply represent  a transmission of sales expectations 
back up the line. In that event, expected sales would still be the driving 
force in inventory investment. Even so, the relevant sales forecast would 
have to be linked to the total length of the production period rather than 
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DEFENSE  AND  BUSINESS  EQUIPMENT 
Orders are a particularly important determinant of inventories within 
the defense and business equipment industries. Both of these finished goods 
industries are dominated by production to order. For both, production ex- 
tends over several quarters and orders result in a major impact on income 
and production, reflected in inventory accumulation, in advance of the ac- 
tual expenditures. The timing discrepancy between defense expenditures 
and their impact on the economy has been widely recognized and analyzed.4 
But the timing effect is not limited to defense goods. It is important for 
other final products, such as business equipment, that involve a sufficiently 
long production-to-order process. 
Several factors argue in favor of  a separate treatment of  the defense 
and equipment group within durable manufacturing. Its inventory-sales 
ratio is far higher than the average and thus contributes to erratic move- 
ments in the aggregate ratio when the output mix shifts between equipment 
and defense on  the  one  hand and consumer-oriented industries on  the 
other. Second,  the inventory-sales ratio of this group is highly variable 
over periods of  several years and is not readily explained in terms of  a 
preferred  buffer stock relative to sales. Third, to the extent that they reflect 
a firm commitment for future final sales, orders, rather than sales, should 
be stressed as the initial source of stimulus to inventory building in this 
group. 
Separate estimates of inventories of the business equipment and defense 
industries do not exist on a basis that corresponds with the national income 
accounts. But an aggregate industry series for shipments, inventories, and 
new orders is available.5  Although it is geared to book values and is not 
readily converted into constant dollars, this series closely approximates 
the major movements of the national income accounts data. 
Shown in Table  1 is an empirical relationship that explains inventory 
4. See, for example,  Murray  L. Weidenbaum,  "The  Timing  of the Economic  Impact 
of Government  Spending," National Tax Journal, Vol.  12 (March  1959), pp. 79-85.  The 
timing adjustment  has also been introduced  into several  econometric  models, such as 
those of the University  of Michigan  and the Federal  Reserve  Board-Massachusetts  In- 
stitute of Technology.  This is usually  accomplished  by introducing  next period's  change 
in defense  spending  as a determinant  of current  inventory  accumulation. 
5.  U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories, and  Orders: 
1947-63  (revised), Series M3-1 (1963), Table 8, and  ...  1961-1968,  Series M3-1.1 (1968). 216  Barry Bosworth 
accumulation in this sector in terms of current sales, the buying policy 
variable previously used as a measure of delivery delays, and a lag struc- 
ture on new orders over the previous eight quarters. Inventory accumula- 
tion is thus viewed as primarily the result of a timing discrepancy between 
production and shipments, both  of  which are related to  previously re- 
ceived new orders. The lagged inventory stock does not enter significantly 
into the equation, nor do current or lagged sales. These results illustrate 
the sharp difference  between inventory behavior in this industry and in the 
sectors that are oriented more toward production to stock.6 
The  measure of  delivery delays is  particularly important during the 
1966 period when excessive demand pressures and fears of material short- 
ages apparently had a major impact on inventory accumulation. The or- 
ders formulation also captures the post-1966 rise in the inventory-sales 
ratio, for the average of the errors from 1966 to  1969 is essentially zero. 
An attempt was made to test for shifts in the mix of orders toward items 
with  longer  or  shorter delivery periods by  including aerospace orders 
separately; but this did not significantly improve the fit. It would appear 
that a separation of business equipment and defense from the rest of du- 
rable manufacturing is sufficient to capture the major effects of variations 
in the average period of production, and further division is not of crucial 
importance. Equations similar to that of Table 1 with coefficients of deter- 
mination  above  0.8  were  obtained for  separate estimates of  inventory 
investment in defense products and in machinery and equipment. 
Given these results for the defense and equipment group, one should 
ideally separate it from the total of durable manufacturing and then ex- 
plain inventory investment for the other durable industries. But the data 
do not permit such an approach. As noted above, only book value data 
are available for inventories of defense and equipment, and these obviously 
cannot  be  subtracted from  the  constant-dollar stocks  of  total  durable 
manufacturing so as to derive a reliable estimate of inventory investment 
for the rest of  durable manufacturing. It seemed advisable therefore to 
adopt an unusual approach, focusing on the inventory investment of total 
durable manufacturing but using as an explanatory variable the predicted 
values from the inventory equation for the equipment and defense group. 
6. The buying  policy variable  reflects  in part the level of sales. But the fact that it is a 
highly  significant  explanatory  variable  does not imply  that sales  are  contributing  much  to 
the explanation.  As reported  in Table 1, sales  taken  separately  have  a tiny and statistically 
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In doing this, shipments, new orders, and lagged inventory stock of the 
equipment and defense group-adjusted  by the durable manufacturing de- 
flators, for lack of anything better-are  excluded from the corresponding 
independent variables for total durable manufacturing. 
Two  alternative inventory  equations  for  durable manufacturing are 
shown in Table 1. Equation (4) essentially follows a buffer stock formula- 
tion, except for the special treatment of defense and equipment. The coeffi- 
cient of 1.8 on the predicted inventory investment of the defense and equip- 
ment group presumably reflects a magnified impact of correlated inventory 
buildups in industries supplying the defense and equipment group.  It is 
striking that the defense and equipment prediction is the most highly sig- 
nificant of all the explanatory variables. The negative impact of existing 
stocks also comes through far more strongly than the influence of either 
current or lagged sales. 
Equation (5)  is more complex in that it  includes distributed lags on 
changes in new orders and on a second variable, constructed by multiply- 
ing the capacity utilization rate by the change in new orders. The negative 
coefficient on the second variable signifies that high utilization reduces the 
impact of a rise in orders on the inventory-sales ratio. Such an interaction 
may emerge for various reasons: (1) economies in the use  of  work-in- 
process stocks as the production pipeline fills up; (2) a postponement of the 
production response to new orders at high utilization of capacity; or (3) a 
shortening of the production period, with a consequent reduction in the 
ratio of goods-in-process to shipments as demand pressures increase.7 
The inclusion of the orders variables brings the coefficient on the predic- 
tion for defense and equipment close to unity. With orders to supplying in- 
dustries  explicitly taken into account, the expected investment of the defense 
and equipment group is simply translated dollar for dollar into the total for 
durable manufacturing. The use of information on new orders significantly 
improves the equation, but because of the difficulty of predicting orders, 
equation (4) may be preferable for forecasting purposes. 
The inclusion of orders variables is, of course, not new, but it has usually 
been accomplished by using levels of, or changes in, unfilled orders rather 
than the inflow of new orders. In using unfilled orders, previous studies 
7. Because  current  sales are also in the equation  and some part of a rise  in orders  will 
be reflected  in them, the orders  coefficients  do not measure  the total effect of orders  on 
inventories.  Also, since the lagged coefficients  on the interaction  term do not sum to 
zero, my results  are not fully consistent  with explanation  (2). 218  Barry Bosworth 
have emphasized precautionary motives for stock building rather than the 
consequences of the lag between orders and delivery. Once a lag structure 
for new orders was included in equation (5), no significant results could be 
found for unfilled orders; the precautionary motive appears to  be more 
accurately measured by the series on purchase commitments in excess of 
sixty days. 
SOME  FURTHER  RESULTS 
In all of the above equations, experiments were conducted with more 
elaborate calculations of anticipated sales and price expectations (primarily 
distributed lags on past changes). A significant  relationship never emerged, 
and the coefficients were only infrequently of the expected signs. Such fac- 
tors could, however, influence inventories indirectly through the flow of 
new orders in durable  manufacturing.  No direct role for monetary variables 
could be identified. Despite isolated reported instances it is difficult to be- 
lieve that monetary policy can have a significant direct impact on  this 
demand component.  Such measures as the bank loan rate, interest rate 
differentials, and rates of change of the monetary base were tested-all 
without success. 
Sales forecast errors have been stressed in many studies of  inventory 
behavior. They are particularly  important for those theories of the business 
cycle that look to inventories as a source of endogenous cyclical behavior. 
Since 1959 the Office of Business Economics has collected at the beginning 
of each quarter manufacturers' sales and inventory anticipations for the 
current and following quarters. In a recent study Hirsch and Lovell exam- 
ined in detail both the accuracy of the anticipations data and their place in 
the inventory decision.' They found that anticipations were a more accurate 
predictor of actual sales for individual firms and industry aggregates than 
previous studies had  indicated. On  the  other hand,  sales  anticipations 
appeared to  be  of  only  marginal value in  explaining actual inventory 
accumulation. 
My results, based on a considerable expansion of the data beyond the 
eighteen quarters used in the Hirsch and Lovell study, strongly support 
their conclusions. Reestimation of the aggregate inventory equations they 
used, together with a variety of alternative  equations, suggests that produc- 
8. Albert A. Hirsch and Michael C. Lovell, Sales Anticipations  and Inventory  Be- 
havior  (John Wiley & Sons, 1969). Analyzing Inventory Investment  219 
tion plans are sufficiently  flexible to make sales forecast errors a relatively 
minor source of disturbance. The sale anticipations were at best of mar- 
ginal importance. If the "expected sales" of the buffer stock formulation 
are measured as a weighted average of actual sales and previously reported 
anticipated sales, the weight attached to the latter was very low-only  0.08 
for durables and 0.04 for nondurables. 
However, use of the reported anticipations of inventory investment did 
yield equations nearly as accurate as those of Table 1. The sales forecast 
errors still played no significant role even in conjunction with the inventory 
anticipations. These results are consistent with those reported in the previ- 
ous section, which suggested that inventory changes within durable manu- 
facturing are largely anticipated and result from the structure of the pro- 
duction process. The proper place to  search further for  aid from  sales 
forecast errors seems to be within the trade sector. In that area, the length 
of delivery periods may limit the flexibility of stock adjustments to  sur- 
prises in sales. 
Recent  Developments 
The current economic slowdown has been marked by a steady and quite 
smooth decline in the rate of growth in real GNP that began with the impo- 
sition of restrictive  stabilization policy in the middle of 1968. It has not been 
accompanied by the violent swings in inventory investment that were so 
apparent in previous experience. The  1966-67 period provides the most 
recent illustration of a more active role for inventory investment. Nonfarm 
inventory accumulation totaled more than $14 billion (1958 prices) in 1966 
and soared to a peak rate of $19 billion in the fourth quarter. In contrast, 
1969 was a year of moderate inventory accumulation at a rate less than 
half that of 1966. In addition, the 1966 increase was associated with a rapid 
expansion of defense spending. Since a reversal of the war buildup is now 
underway, it is becoming increasingly  important to determine  the impact of 
defense orders on inventory investment. 
This section first describes an attempt to isolate several factors that made 
1966-67 an abnormal period of inventory accumulation and that distin- 
guish it from the current  period. It goes on to an examination of the sources 
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THE  1966-67  EXPERIENCE 
In part the difference between 1966 and the current period can be traced 
to a slower rate of growth of final sales in 1969. But between the end of 1965 
and the end of 1966, the accumulation of nonfarm inventories  was $8 billion 
in excess of what was required to hold constant the inventory-sales ratios 
for the three major sectors. In 1969, by contrast, the excess appears to have 
been a more modest $1.5 billion. As Table 2 reveals, the equations do not 
capture this excess precisely; they understate inventory investment by $2.2 
billion in 1966 and overstate it by $0.8 billion in 1969. But they do identify 
several factors that contributed to the abnormal inventory accumulation 
of 1966. 
First, inventory investment was significantly affected by the very high 
levels of resource utilization throughout 1966. The lengthening of delivery 
lags on purchased materials led firms voluntarily to increase their inventory 
stocks relative to sales. The rise during the year of 10 percentage points in 
the proportion of firms reporting purchasing commitments in excess of 
sixty days is estimated to have contributed a $2.2 billion addition to the 
inventory stock during the year. In addition, the high utilization rates and 
substantial backlogs of unfilled orders exerted a stimulative effect on pro- 
duction, and thus on work-in-process inventories, and delayed their re- 
sponse to the slowing in the inflow of new orders that began in the middle 
of the year. 
The rapid expansion of defense and equipment orders in late 1965 and 
1966  was the second major influence  on inventory investment of that period; 
it significantly  raised the normal inventory-sales  relationship within durable 
manufacturing. Between the third quarter of 1965 and the third quarter of 
1966, new orders in the equipment and defense group increased by 25 per- 
cent and exceeded shipments  by $7.6 billion. As a result, this group of indus- 
tries made a large contribution to overall inventory accumulation. While 
the group represented  only one quarter of total shipments of durable manu- 
factures, it was directly responsible for nearly half of the $6.5 billion rise in 
durable manufacturing inventories in 1966. 
It is doubtful, however, that the 1966 inventory increase in equipment 
and defense can be attributed  exclusively to the lag between production and 
shipments and the  consequent buildup of  work-in-process. Tha buying 
policy variable  contributes $1.2 billion to inventory accumulation in defense 
and equipment during the year. 
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guished from that of defense and equipment combined. Since a separate 
classification of the defense industry does not exist for the 1966 period, a 
direct measure is not possible. An indirect estimate of the defense buildup 
was made by relating the orders of the combined equipment and defense 
group to military prime contract awards for hard goods, and the shipments 
series to  government purchases of durable goods. Orders and shipments 
were then reduced to a level consistent with a 2 percent growth in prime 
contracts and government purchases starting from their actual levels of the 
first half of 1965. The 2 percent upcreep was intended as a rough allowance 
for price increases. This provided an estimate of what shipments and orders 
would have been in the absence of the defense buildup. These estimates in 
turn were used in equation (3) of Table 1 to calculate what inventory invest- 
ment of the equipment and defense industries would have been in such a 
world. 
The implied impact of Vietnam war expenditures is shown on a semi- 
annual basis in Table 3. These estimates are very crude, but they indicate a 
Table 3.  Inventory Investment of the Equipment and Defense Group and 
Estimated Impact of the Vietnam Buildup,  by Half-Years 1965-70 
Annual rates  in billions of dollars 
Inventory  investment  by 
equipment  and defense  group 
Year  Estimated  Change  in defense 
and  defense  purchases  from 
half  Total  component  preceding  perioda 
1965  First  0.8  0.0  -1.2 
Second  2.0  0.6  1.5 
1966  First  3.0  1.5  4.3 
Second  4.0  2.0  6.2 
1967  First  3.3  2.0  6.2 
Second  2.0  1.2  2.3 
1968  First  1.6  0.8  2.3 
Second  0.8  0.0  0.9 
1969  First  3.2  0.5  -0.5 
Second  4.1  -0.2  -0.5 
1970  First  0.9  -1.0  -1.2 
Sources: Inventory investment by equipment and defense group-U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Manufac- 
turers'  Shipmnents, Inventories,  and  Orders:  1961-1968,  Series  M3-1.1  (1968),  and  "Current  Industrial  Re- 
ports," Series M3-1 (1969 and 1970), monthly issues; defense component-estimated  by author (see text); 
defense purchases-national  income accounts defense purchases, excluding military wages and salaries, 
computed from data in Survey of Current  Business, Vols. 49 and 50 (July 1969 and July 1970, respectively), 
and unpublished data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics. 
a.  The data are shown in current  prices because of the lack of a suitable deflator; as a result, the decline of 
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substantial impact on inventory accumulation in 1966 and 1967. The timing 
adjustment also shifts into the first  two years of this five-year  period a larger 
proportion of the economic impact of the war than is implied by the rise in 
defense expenditures. 
Since they ignore the secondary effects on the inventories and shipments 
of the material-supplying  industries, these estimates understate the full im- 
pact of the war buildup. The first equation for durable manufacturing in 
Table  1 would suggest that the impact on inventory investment of  the 
material-supplying  industries  can be substantial. On the other hand, a large 
proportion of  the early expenditures were for  services and nondurable 
goods,  sectors in  which  the  timing  discrepancy is  of  relatively minor 
importance. 
These estimates  of  the  inventory buildup  appear to  be  significantly 
smaller than those Galper and Gramlich developed in their study of the lag 
between prime contract awards and defense expenditures.9  My results imply 
a shorter average time lag between production and shipment than theirs. In 
addition, their measure of the inventory accumulation as the difference 
between production and shipments is conceptually different from the one 
used here. 
The estimates in Table 3 are also somewhat smaller than those provided 
by the Department of Commerce to Okun and Teeters, which were intended 
to include secondary effects on supplying industries.'0 
Durable manufacturing was not the only source of the abnormal inven- 
tory buildup of 1966. In fact, one of the intriguing aspects of the period is 
the extent to which an excessive rate of inventory accumulation occurred 
in every sector. This would suggest that the primary cause was a general 
economy-wide influence such as tight resource utilization, rather than a 
specific influence such as the defense buildup. 
The 1966 rise in nondurable inventories is explained quite well by a com- 
bination of increased precautionary holdings, a sharp curtailment of the 
rate of growth of final sales, and a substantial drop in farm prices in the 
fourth quarter. In addition, the rapid growth of final sales in 1965 resulted 
in a low ratio of inventories to sales at the beginning of 1966. 
As Table 2 indicates, I do not have a satisfactory explanation for the rise 
of durable trade inventories in 1966. The large increases of the second and 
9. Harvey Galper and Edward Gramlich, "A Technique  for Forecasting Defense 
Expenditures," Review of Economics and Statistics,  Vol.  50 (May  1968), pp.  143-55. 
10. Arthur M. Okun and Nancy H. Teeters, "The Full Employment  Surplus  Re- 
visited,"  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1:1970),  p. 89. 224  Barry Bosworth 
fourth quarters are substantially underestimated  by the equation. This sec- 
tor thus illustrates one of the difficulties of relying on a pure accelerator 
approach to inventory behavior. The equation is adequate for predicting 
the typical movements of inventories and even their response to an existing 
stock-sales disequilibrium. But a delayed response to sales changes does not 
appear to be a satisfactory explanation for the initial departure from the 
normal inventory-sales ratio. 
An examination of the errors in the equation also reveals that it consis- 
tently underestimates  the magnitude of the major cyclical swings in durable 
trade inventories. This may be a problem that stems from using actual sales 
as a proxy for expected sales, since the equation may be unable to distin- 
guish between erratic short-run sales fluctuations and the  more  drastic 
cyclical movements that lead to major inventory adjustments. But I was 
unable to improve the results with either additional variables or disaggrega- 
tion. I can report only that the increase in the inventory-sales ratio during 
1966 was not limited to any specific category of durable trade and that the 
ratio returned to a more normal level by the middle of 1967. 
During 1967, the response of inventory investment in durable trade and 
nondurables to the excesses that existed at the beginning of the period can 
be viewed as fairly typical by historical standards. For both sectors the 
inventory-sales ratio had returned to more normal levels by the end of the 
year, and the errors reported in Table 2 are not particularly large. In du- 
rable trade, inventory investment dropped to $1.2 billion in the first half of 
1967 from the previous year's rate of  nearly $3.0 billion.  Reflecting a 
slower rate of adjustment,  inventory investment in nondurables  remained at 
a high level in the first half of 1967, but fell later in the year. 
Inventory investment declined  sharply within  durable manufacturing 
after 1966. Nonetheless, the inventory-sales ratio did not return to the level 
that  prevailed before  1966 and inventory investment remained positive 
throughout 1967. In this sense, the adjustment to the initial excesses was 
surprisingly mild. The major reason for this behavior was the shift in the 
composition of output toward the defense and equipment group that con- 
tinued into 1967. Defense and equipment shipments rose as a proportion of 
total shipments, reaching 28 percent by the end of  1967. In addition, the 
buildup of work-in-process within defense and equipment resulted in a rise 
in the inventory-sales ratio of that group that did not reflect an inventory 
excess in the usual sense. These two factors together account for over 50 
percent of the rise in the overall inventory-sales  ratio between 1965 and the 
end of 1967. Thus they substantially reduce the estimates of the inventory Analyzing Inventory Investment  225 
excess that actually existed within the period. The separate treatment of 
equipment and defense within durable manufacturing allows the equation 
to reflect the 1967 behavior with relatively minor errors. 
THE 1969-70  SLOWDOWN 
In contrast to the 1966-67 experience,  inventory investment maintained a 
fairly stable rate throughout 1969. It then adjusted to the decline in final 
sales in early 1970 without a major change in inventory-sales ratios. To be 
sure, the rate of inventory accumulation fell by $5.1 billion (1958 prices) 
between 1969 and the first half of 1970-from  $7.2 billion to $2.1 billion. 
This drop accounted for a major proportion of the decline in output. Unlike 
1966-67, and like the previous four periods of recession, 1970 witnessed a 
decline in real final sales. Yet it is notable that, like 1967 and unlike the pre- 
vious recessions, inventory investment remained positive in 1970. 
I attribute the greater stability of recent inventory investment largely to 
the reduced role of the special factors that dominated earlier periods. The 
absence of precautionary influences on inventories, the relative stability in 
the composition of output in so far as it influenced industries  with extensive 
work-in-process, and the more gradual slowing of final sales all contributed 
to a smoother inventory adjustment than in 1966-67. 
In particular, no major excesses of inventory building developed during 
1969. The growth of real final sales shifted gradually downward during 
much of 1968 and 1969. In the prolonged period of gradual slackening in 
overall demand, inventories became relatively free of capacity restrictions. 
The  proportion  of  firms reporting long-term purchasing commitments 
gradually declined after the end of 1966, and in 1969 reached a level below 
that of 1965. Thus during 1969 most of the precautionary  inventory buildup 
of 1966 had been eliminated. With the reduction in utilization rates, inven- 
tory investment was not being stimulated by large backlogs when orders 
turned down in late 1969. 
Defense activity slowed substantially, but much of the initial reduction in 
spending was concentrated in nondurables and services, and therefore it did 
not have a major inventory impact. In addition, the drop in prime military 
contracts during 1969 was largely offset by a continued expansion of orders 
for private  equipment. Thus the decline of orders  for equipment and defense 
products was limited to the first half of 1970 and even then did not have a 
major effect on production or stocks. 
The equations are able to track the 1969-70 experience with a fair degree 226  Barry Bosworth 
of accuracy. However, the durable trade equation again underestimates  the 
magnitude of the cyclical swing in inventory investment. The inventory 
adjustment  in this sector appears to have proceeded at a slightly more rapid 
rate than that implied by the equation, with a $2.6 billion drop in the rate of 
investment between the second half of 1969 and the first half of 1970. As 
real final sales of nondurables stalled in the second quarter of 1970, non- 
durable stocks piled up, but the inventory-sales ratio did not move dras- 
tically out of line with historical experience. Only in the second quarter did 
stocks of durable manufacturers  decline; that sector's inventory-sales ratio 
rose 6 percent above its level of the last half of  1969, with the increase 
concentrated in work-in-process. 
The Outlook 
Will inventory investment be a leading element in the expansion that 
many experts see on the horizon, as it was in recoveries from the previous 
four recessions? Two  major factors suggest more sluggish behavior: the 
background of  greater stability during the  1969-70  slowdown,  and the 
expected continuation of the decline in defense spending from its Vietnam 
war peak. 
First, the likelihood of a large rebound in inventory investment is reduced 
by the stability of inventory behavior in the recent past. As described  above, 
stocks did not  become excessive to  any major degree in  1968-69. And 
because excesses did not materialize, they did not have to be worked off by 
liquidation of stocks. Thus inventory investment starts from its positive 
rate of $2.1 billion (1958 prices) in the first half of 1970-in  sharp contrast 
with the negative  rates ranging from $4 billion to $6 billion that marked the 
last stages of the previous four recessions. Because of  the substantially 
higher base,  the  prospective upswing  of  inventory investment is  most 
unlikely to have the dramatic proportions witnessed in past business cycle 
recoveries. 
An additional source of restraint will operate in durable manufacturing, 
where defense spending will, to a degree, reverse its effect of 1966-67. De- 
fense Department prime contract awards for hard goods have declined 33 
percent since the fourth quarter of 1968, with an 18 percent decline in the 
first half of 1970. Furthermore, any major expansion in private equipment 
orders that could offset this decline seems rather unlikely. New orders for 
defense and equipment, which rose  11 percent in  1969, began to  reflect 
some of the scheduled decline of defense activity in a 6 percent drop in the Analyzing Inventory Investment  227 
first half of  1970 from the second half of  1969. Because of  production 
delays, the impact of the decline in orders on inventories will be concen- 
trated primarily in the latter part of 1970 and in 1971. 
On the way down as well as on the way up, the especially high inventory- 
sales ratio of defense and equipment will play a significant role. Reflecting 
that higher ratio, the rise in shipments of this group from 24 percent to 31 
percent of total shipments of durable manufacturing  accounts for an addi- 
tion of about $2.5 billion to the total stock in the middle of 1970. If their 
share should fall back toward its pre-Vietnam  level the impact on the over- 
all inventory-sales  ratio would not be insignificant.  The current drop in de- 
fense orders, coupled with an anticipated leveling of private investment, 
makes some movement in this direction highly probable. 
If the existing level of  prime contracts is compared with  anticipated 
national defense spending for 1971, it appears that prime contracts in the 
second quarter of 1970 reflect nearly all of the scheduled reduction. There- 
fore, on the assumption of a constant level of contract awards in the future, 
I estimate that the defense component of inventory investment will drop to 
annual rates of decumulation of $2 billion in the last half of 1970 and $1.5 
billion in the first half of 1971. Of course, such a reduction would not com- 
pare with the extreme inventory decumulation observed in the post-Korean 
war experience of 1953-54. Total prime contract awards dropped 76 per- 
cent between the first quarter of 1953 and the first quarter  of 1954. The cur- 
rent decline is of far more moderate proportions. In addition, while most of 
the reduction in defense stocks is still to come, it appears that inventory 
investment has largely adjusted to the decline in civilian demand. Thus, the 
two factors will not be simultaneously depressing inventory accumulation. 
Rather, this analysis implies that, assuming no major change in fixed 
investment, the increase in the inventory stock over the next year will be 
about $2 billion less than proportionate to the rise in final sales. If real final 
sales should grow as much as 4 percent, inventory investment would have 
to be $7 billion (1958 prices) to keep the stock proportionate to sales. The 
suggested downward adjustment of  $2 billion would then point to  a  $5 
billion rate of inventory investment. If, however, real final sales should rise 
only 2 percent, the indicated rate of inventory investment would be only 
$1.5 billion. 
All in all, the analysis would suggest that an inventory cycle is not an ade- 
quate frame of reference for viewing the present behavior of the economy. 
Instead of a sharp and severe cycle, there seems to be a slow but steady 
departure of GNP growth from a full employment path. Comments  and 
Discussion 
James Duesenberry: Barry Bosworth is an unusually cheerful inventory 
investigator. Others who have worked in this field have seemed, at times, 
to  throw up their hands because of the complexities. Yet  the fact that 
Bosworth offers a more encouraging report on the possibilities of explain- 
ing inventories may reveal more about writing style and personality than 
about the actual quantitative results. His own standard errors still leave 
substantial unexplained variation in inventories, even though, considering 
the difficulties, the equations look good. 
The delivery lag or buying policy variable is an interesting contribution. 
But I am bothered by the underlying logic of that notion. It seems to say 
that when capacity utilization goes up, firms have trouble filling orders 
and a delivery lag appears. This leads the buyers of materials to  try to 
protect themselves by increasing their orders and by making commitments 
farther ahead in the hope  of  getting their supplies guaranteed. That in 
turn stimulates producers of materials to  turn out more. Consequently, 
we end up with more inventory, rather than less, as one might think at 
first. In the case of a capacity bottleneck, people are trying to buy things 
that cannot be produced fast enough. That could result in drawing inven- 
tories down, particularly at the manufacturing level, just as readily as it 
could push stocks up. The equations say that delivery lags operate to in- 
crease stocks,  and the buying policy  variable comes  through loud  and 
strong in that direction. Perhaps one reason for that effect is that, in a 
regime of  supply difficulties, firms accumulate work in process because 
they run into  delays and can't finish output. A  semifinished thing sits 
there on the floor and gets counted in inventories until some  order for 
materials is filled. 
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I'm not proposing to explain how it operates, however. Here is a case 
where the empirical results are great, but the underlying logic  has not 
been spelled out. I think it would be worthwhile for somebody to work 
on that. 
A second feature of the statistical approach in this paper is the way de- 
fense and business equipment are chained up to  durable manufacturing 
as a whole. That appeals to me as an ingenious way of getting around some 
rather difficult problems. One advantage is  that it's probably easier to 
predict defense and equipment orders, and to analyze the causes of their 
movements, than it is to predict or explain the change in orders for overall 
durable manufacturing. The total involves all kinds of changes in orders 
from one sector of manufacturing to another. 
Other economists have previously found some type of orders variable to 
be very useful in an inventory equation. But then they needed an equation 
to predict orders, or at least unfilled orders, and often they could not get 
over this hurdle to complete the system of two separate equations. This 
aspect of the Bosworth equations has not been tested. In testing this ap- 
proach, it would be necessary to see how well one could do forecasting de- 
fense orders. They have rather long lags, so that one would not have to do 
too much forecasting to make this work as a complete system. The diffi- 
culties of predicting all durable orders suggests that the simpler equation 
(4) might work out better for forecasting than equation (5), which requires 
the change-in-orders variables. 
Third, as Bosworth points out and as the errors of Table 2 show, 1966 
seemed to  be influenced by some general bullishness factor that swelled 
inventory investment in nondurables and durables alike. It is striking that 
the errors in  1966 were in the same direction, all across the board, even 
with the buying policy variable included. This raises suspicions that some 
factor, which is not picked up adequately here, was operating. It points to 
the need for detective work to find the omitted variable. 
One final remark on the equations. The durables trade equation shows 
a distressing amount of unexplained variation generally and does partic- 
ularly poorly in 1966 and 1970. I suspect that this may be, in part, because 
the sales variable isn't always playing the role expected of it. The equation 
essentially interprets  current sales as a predictor of future sales and, there- 
fore, as an indicator of the appropriate level of inventories to meet de- 
mand. In durables, particularly in automobiles, there is a strong seasonal 
element involving new models. Although most  of the time current sales 230  Barry Bosworth 
may properly reflect the strength of the demand, there are obviously some 
periods when sales are being pushed upward by firms precisely because 
they want to get rid of inventory and perhaps because demand has been 
disappointing. Obviously, large sales of that distressed kind-due  to sup- 
pliers' extra efforts-have  a different impact on inventory decisions than 
large sales that result from active consumer decisions. 
Perhaps the durable trade equation needs variables that reflect the an- 
nual model pattern more closely than does a seasonal adjustment of the 
industry. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that equations 
like those dealing with automobile sales have errors with high serial corre- 
lation. People who sell these things know these correlations in the errors 
from experience. Their expectations reflect the continuity, so that when 
things are sour they expect them to stay sour. The combination of those 
two  features-the  model  year aspect of  products and the  considerable 
continuity in strength of demand-may  require a different kind of inven- 
tory equation for durable trade inventories than is offered in this paper. 
Finally, I want to comment on the forecasting message. Barry Bosworth 
is  telling  us  that  nothing  exciting is  likely to  happen to  inventories- 
neither a reduction nor any big bounce back from the currently low rates 
of  accumulation. I  think that  basic message makes sense. It  might  be 
worthwhile to get a little perspective by making a slightly different com- 
parison of the  1966-67 episode with 1969-70. I want to  emphasize that 
there was a very substantial swing in inventory investment from the last 
half of 1969 to the first half of 1970. In the case of durables, it was nearly 
as large as the swing from the second half of 1966 to the first half of 1967- 
$6.5 billion compared with $7.5 billion. The periods seem so different for 
several reasons. First, nondurables reinforced the downward movement 
to a greater extent in 1966-67. Second, there was a very sharp peak in the 
fourth quarter of 1966 and then a steep drop to the bottom in the second 
quarter of 1967. The timing was not nearly so concentrated in 1969-70. 
On the rebound in 1967, only a very modest lift came from inventory 
investment. The rate in durables  was $3.2 billion in the first half of 1967 and 
$5.3 billion in the  second half. The contribution was  only a couple  of 
billion  dollars in  that  category. Nondurables were very little  changed. 
Thus, late in 1967, in the face of rapidly expanding final sales and a con- 
tinuing (if slightly diminishing) positive impact from defense, there was 
only a modest upswing in the rate of inventory investment. For the second 
half of 1970, even less of a lift is probable. Final sales are expected to in- Analyzing Inventory Investment  231 
crease  less in the second  half of 1970  than in the second  half of 1967.  De- 
fense orders  are declining  and pushing  downward.  All of this suggests 
that the movement  of inventory  investment  is not going to be a major 
factor  in either  direction. 
Arthur  M. Okun: One of the interesting  features  of this paper  is its finding 
on where  disaggregation  pays and where  lumping  together  is acceptable 
and even desirable.  The results  are not necessarily  what one might  intui- 
tively expect. For example,  it is not clear why combining  nondurable 
manufacturing  and trade is satisfactory.  Bosworth  points out that ship- 
ments by nondurable  manufacturers  to merchants  in nondurable  trade 
simply  shift the holding of inventories  initially.  To the extent that there 
is a statistical  problem  involving  either  double-counting  or failing  to count 
stocks that are in transit,  aggregating  the two categories  can't improve 
matters.  To the extent  that there is an important  random  element  as to 
when shipments  take place from manufacturers  to  retailers,  the data 
could be accurate,  but might  still be subject  to large  disturbances  depend- 
ing on just what  happened  on the last day of the quarter.  In that  case, one 
might  encounter  offsetting  errors  in trying  to explain  trade  and manufac- 
turing  separately  and might  reduce  the errors  by combining  them. 
In a sense, if combined  estimates  work out well, their success  suggests 
that the official  data are really  capturing  the facts properly,  and that per- 
haps the statistical  problem  of "float,"  or in-transit  stocks,  is not terribly 
serious. 
It is also striking  that disaggregating  by stage of fabrication  did not 
help. There  are good analytical  reasons  to believe  it might,  but it did not. 
On the other hand, it pays to separate  business  equipment  and defense 
from  the rest of durable  manufacturing.  Moreover,  combining  equipment 
and defense  is a special  kind of aggregation  that seems  to be acceptable. 
Presumably  this works  because  these  two industries  have  the same  charac- 
teristics  of production  to order  and of substantial  lags in the production 
process.  The nature  of demand  is entirely  different  for the defense  industry 
and for the business  equipment  industry. 
One  recurring  theme  of the paper  is the major  significance  of the differ- 
ence between  production  to order and production  to stock. This raises 
other interesting  and thought-provoking  issues. First, it is dangerous  to 
assume  that production  to order  and long lags in the production  prodess 
necessarily  go together.  To be sure, both will appear  in the case of ex- 232  Barry Bosworth 
pensive, highly specialized products. But fruit growers have long lags and 
yet produce to stock. And good short-order cooks produce to order with 
short lags. It may be important to distinguish these two forces in inventory 
models. 
Second, where there is both a long production process and production 
to  order, firms might be expected to  be able to  predict their shipments 
accurately over a significant time horizon. Basically, their shipments for 
some months ahead ought to be determined by what is in the pipeline- 
by supply considerations rather than any developments in demand. I do 
not think the data show that such firms are especially accurate in their 
sales  forecasts. Maybe  the  supply  considerations are hard to  predict. 
Maybe such firms are not terribly interested in near-term shipments and 
do not make much effort to forecast them accurately. 
The paper also has several interesting results on what variables work 
and where they work. It is striking that the equations imply that nondura- 
bles are the only sector in which, on the basis of quarterly data, a rise in 
current sales means a significant decline in inventory investment. It is the 
only place where surprises in sales push inventories in the opposite direc- 
tion for as long as a quarter. In durable trade and durable manufacturing, 
the higher the current quarter's sales, the higher the current quarter's in- 
ventories are expected to be, according to these equations. That doesn't 
leave much scope for involuntary accumulation or liquidation of stocks. 
The results on the buying policy variable are resounding. I will be pay- 
ing more attention to that series as a leading indicator, in light of these 
findings. I  am puzzled, however, by the fact that it works for business 
equipment and defense and not  for the rest of  durable manufacturing. 
Could that throw any light on the questions James Duesenberry raised 
about the possible negative-as  well as positive-impacts  of delivery lags 
on stocks? 
In the review of recent experience, the paper reveals what a heroic role 
nondurable stocks have played in  1969-70.  In the  1966-67  period, the 
downswing in the nondurable accumulation rate was  $5 billion. In the 
current period, the nondurable rate actually rose $1.5 billion, from $2.6 
billion in the third quarter of 1969 to $4.1 billion in the second quarter of 
1970. It was never down more than $1.6 billion during this period. It is a 
most unusual candidate to be cast as a hero in stabilizing the economy. 
In viewing the upswing, the biggest contrast between the present situa- 
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or 1957-58. In those episodes, inventory investment started from a sizable 
negative rate-especially  sizable when viewed as a percentage of the lower 
GNP  of those ancient times. As Bosworth emphasizes, a cyclical recovery 
model in terms of 1957-58 and 1960-61 would be way off base as a guide 
to the present inventory outlook. 
Barry Bosworth: I did not mean to imply that disaggregating by stage of 
fabrication failed to yield results. I did experiment with disaggregating in 
this manner. I found drastically different behavior for goods in process in 
durable manufacturing than for finished goods  or purchased materials. 
For the latter two, a buffer stock approach seemed to work well. I chose 
the separation of equipment and defense over the disaggregation  by stage of 
fabrication merely because I thought that orders  for defense and equipment 
were more tractable than orders for total durable goods manufacturing. 
I did reach negative conclusions on disaggregation of nondurable manufac- 
turing by stage of fabrication, and so have other studies that explored this 
approach. 
General Discussion 
R. A. Gordon asked whether price expectations could have influenced 
the recent pattern of inventory investment. If price expectations had been 
unimportant for most of the period to which the equations were fitted, 
they might not show up significantly in them, and yet might have had a 
particular effect in this most recent experience. 
Bosworth replied that he had experimented some with price expecta- 
tions, but did not get positive results. He  agreed that, if price effects are 
important, their influence should have been evident in 1969. But 1969 was 
one of the periods when the equations seemed to be working especially 
well. This suggests that 1969 inventory accumulation was not affected in 
any major way by price expectations. 
Lawrence Krause asked whether the buying policy variable might not 
actually be  acting as  a proxy for price anticipations. Bosworth replied 
that the movements of the buying policy variable over time were not con- 
sistent with such a proxy role. It reached a peak early in 1955, before prices 
started rising, and then gradually declined all the way to the 1958 recession. 234  Barry Bosworth 
The same thing happened in 1966-69; it peaked early and then fell by one- 
fourth, returning to its 1964 level. 
Alan  Greenspan supported Bosworth's  interpretation of  the  buying 
policy variable. He  suggested that the lengthening of commitments and 
stock building can be  observed in the steel industry. Greenspan noted 
that a lengthening of commitments by purchasers might reflect their judg- 
ment that they needed to get on the books sooner in order to get delivery 
on time. In that sense, the variable might measure supplier's  policy as much 
as buyer's policy. 
A number of questions focused on the nature and treatment of inventory 
data. Gardner Ackley  asked whether anyone had  tried to  forecast the 
national accounts measure of inventory change in two  stages, first pre- 
dicting book value and then predicting the inventory valuation adjustment 
of the national income accounts. Bosworth said that it appeared possible 
to explain the national accounts measure (that is, the figure adjusted for 
inventory valuation) about as accurately in a single step as one could ex- 
plain book  values. George Jaszi suggested that the erratic movement of 
auto dealers' stocks made these a likely candidate for separate treatment 
from other durable trade stocks; but Bosworth reported that his efforts to 
disaggregate  in this way had not yielded improved results. Alan Greenspan 
suggested that the financial data on trade credit "float" might be investi- 
gated for  possible clues on  the magnitude and movement  of  in-transit 
inventories. 
Most  of the participants in the discussion seemed to share Bosworth's 
general appraisal of a sluggish near-term  outlook for inventory investment. 
William Fellner, however, noted that inventory-sales ratios have tended 
to be higher in the early stages of past cyclical recoveries than they are at 
the present time. He wondered whether this might not offset, in part, some 
of the other factors tending to restrain  the inventory rebound in the current 
situation. Alan Greenspan suggested that the differences  in inventory-sales 
ratios between the present and previous upturns may not be very signifi- 
cant. Price inflation, which affects sales more fully than it affects the book 
value of  stocks, tends to  lower the current statistics on  inventory-sales 
ratios, as compared with earlier periods. 